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This article examines the legal responsibilities under the U.S. export control program for
software vendors that provide software products over the Internet and other companies offering
computing and data processing services under "software as a service" or "cloud computing" business
models. The regulations implementing this export control program restrict the "export" of certain
categories of commercial software products, especially products with data encryption functions and
features, and define the concept of "export" extremely broadly to include a wide range of intangible
transactions. Similarly, the regulations impose legal duties on software vendors and service provid-
ers to prevent their products and services from falling into the hands of persons and entities located
in countries subject to U.S. trade embargoes, proscribed parties (such as international terrorists),
and entities engaged in the prolferation of weapons of mass destruction. This article suggests steps
that software vendors and service providers may (and must) take in order to resolve or mitigate the
tensions and to address the unique compliance challenges presented by the intersection ofstrict regu-
latory duties and the global and semi-anonymous nature of Internet software transactions and cloud
computing.
I. Introduction
The United States maintains a comprehensive program of controls over the export and
reexport of commodities, software, and technology through a series of regulatory pro-
grams. Defense items, specified on the U.S. Munitions List or as otherwise specially de-
signed, modified, customized, or adapted for military use, are subject to the munitions
export control program set forth in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations' (ITAR),
which are issued under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act 2 and are adminis-
tered by the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
* Baker & McKenzie, LLP.
1. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (2010).
2. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2010).
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Commercial (or dual use) commodities, software, and technology are subject to export
controls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).3 These commercial export
controls, which are administered by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and
Security, are directly applicable to most software export transactions and are, therefore,
the focus of this paper.
The export controls embodied in the EAR are implemented by a licensing procedure.
Prior authorization from the Bureau of Industry and Security, in the form of an export
license, may be required for certain export or reexport transactions, depending on:
(i) the export classification and export control status of the commodities, software, or
technology involved in the transaction;4
(ii) the destination or destinations to which those commodities, software, or technology
will be exported or reexported;5
(iii) the identity of the end-user to which the commodities, software, or technology will
be supplied;6 and
(iv) the intended end-use of the commodities, software, or technology.7
In any transaction involving the export or reexport of items subject to the EAR, it is the
exporter that is legally responsible for determining, based on the foregoing factors,
whether the transaction: (i) is authorized without an export license (i.e., the items are
3. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (2010). The EAR were originally issued
under authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended. 50 App. U.S.C.A. App. § 2401-20.
That statute expired on August 20, 2001, but the EAR have been continued in force by Exec. Order No.
13222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44024 (2001), under authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2008).
4. Commodities, software, and technology that are subject to export controls under the EAR are listed on
the Commerce Control List, which is published as Supplement No. I to Part 774 of the EAR. 15 C.F.R. pt.
774 supp. 3 (2008). Those controlled items are organized by export classification control number (ECCN).
Each ECCN entry on the Commerce Control List provides a detailed description by technical specifications
or performance parameters of the items subject to control, the reasons why that item is controlled (e.g.,
national security, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological weapons proliferation, anti-terrorism,
etc.), and the "export license exceptions" that may be available for the export or reexport of the items to some
foreign countries.
5. Controlled countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cambodia, Cuba, China, Georgia, Iraq,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Macau, Moldova, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1. Many items that may be exported without restriction
or under an export license exception to other countries require a specific export license from the Bureau of
Industry and Security for export to any of those controlled countries. Id. Moreover, there are comprehensive
embargoes on exports or reexports of all or substantially all items subject to the EAR to Cuba, Iran, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
6. The U.S. government maintains a series of lists of prohibited and restricted persons and firms (e.g., the
Commerce Department's Denied Parties List; the Commerce Department's Entity List; the Treasury De-
partment's OFAC list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons). Those lists of prohibited and
restricted parties may be found on the Bureau of Industry and Security's website. Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Lists to Check, http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforce-
mentlliststocheck.hun (last visited Apr. 30, 2010). The export or reexport of any item subject to the EAR, to
any such prohibited or restricted party, may be prohibited or may require an export license from the Bureau
of Industry and Security or from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
7. Items that may otherwise be freely exported to almost any foreign country, without restriction or prior
authorization, require export licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security for export to certain countries
if, at the time of export, the exporter knows (or should know) that the items may be used in activities directly
or indirectly related to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missiles. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 736.2(b)(5) (General Prohibition No. 5).
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eligible for export under NLR or no license required); (ii) meets the conditions, require-
ments, and restrictions of an "export license exception" as specified in part 740 of the
EAR; or (iii) requires an export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security.8 For
this purpose, the term "exporter" is defined in section 772.1 of the EAR as: "The person
in the United States who has the authority of a principal party in interest to determine and
control the sending of items out of the United States."9
As discussed in this paper, transactions that involve the export of software by means of
electronic transmission or download over the Internet present significant export compli-
ance challenges, especially where the exporter: (i) is not the developer of the software; and
(ii) has little or no information about the customer. Under such circumstances, the ex-
porter may be unable to make an independent determination as to the ECCN export
classification of the software product in question and may have no information as to the
identity or location of the customer or intended end-user of the software.
There is a third regulatory program that may also restrict Internet transactions involv-
ing U.S. origin software. Specifically, the various Economic Sanctions Regulations,' 0 is-
sued and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,"
generally prohibit the export or reexport of U.S. origin goods, technology (including
software) and services to: (i) countries that are subject to comprehensive U.S. embargoes
(i.e., Cuba, Iran, and Sudan); (ii) entities, wherever located, that are owned or controlled
by or affiliated with the governments of those embargoed countries; (iii) the governments
of certain terrorist supporting countries (e.g., Syria); (iv) international terrorists and for-
eign terrorist organizations; and (v) persons and firms listed on the OFAC list of specially
designated nationals and blocked persons.12 As discussed in this paper, the potential appli-
cation of those OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations implies that entities making
software or services available over the Internet must screen the parties to proposed trans-
actions in order to assure that the software or services will not be received in an embar-
goed country or by a person or entity on the OFAC list of specially designated nationals
and blocked parties.
II. The Concept of an "Export" for Export Control Purposes
In the early days of the software industry, substantially all software transactions involved
the physical shipment and delivery of a tangible embodiment of the software product (i.e.,
software encoded on some form of carrier media, such as a magnetic tape, disk, CD-
ROM, or DVD). With the advent of the Internet, and the tremendous growth in e-
Commerce transactions involving software products, however, a very significant and
growing percentage of all commercial software "fulfillments" or deliveries involve elec-
tronic transmissions or downloads of software code, where there is no shipment of any
tangible item from the supplier to the customer. In many such electronic software trans-
8. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.
9. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1.
10. 31 C.F.R. pts. 500-98 (2010).
11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2010).
12. See Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC Sanctions Programs, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforce-
ment/ofac/programs/index.shtml.
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actions, especially those involving consumer or mass-market software products, the
software supplier is likely to have little or no direct interaction or knowledge of its cus-
tomer, other than a credit card number and an e-mail address.
Unlike export control regimes in a number of other countries, the EAR makes no dis-
tinction, for U.S. export control purposes, between the physical shipment of tangible
items from the United States to a foreign country, and the electronic transmission of
software or technology from the United States to a person or entity located abroad. For
export control purposes, any such physical shipment or electronic transmission is an "ex-
port," which must be effected in conformance with the requirements and restrictions em-
bodied in the EAR. Thus, EAR defines the term "export" to include any "actual shipment
or transmission of items subject to the EAR out of the United States." 3
As discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this paper, infra, a key factor in determining
whether a particular software product is a controlled item under the EAR is the presence
of any data encryption function or features in that software product. Section 734.2(b)(9)
of the EAR sets forth a special, and expansive, definition of the concept of an "export"
with respect to such encryption software, in source code or object code form. An "export"
of encryption source code and object code software occurs when:
(i) there is an actual shipment, transfer, or transmission of that encryption software out
of the United States;
(ii) the software is downloaded to locations outside of the United States (including elec-
tronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer protocol (FTP) sites, and World Wide
Web sites); and
(iii) the software is "made available" for transfer outside of the United States by means of
posting to communications facilities that are accessible to persons outside of the
United States (including electronic bulletin boards, FTP sites, and World Wide Web
sites), unless steps are taken to prevent unauthorized transfer of that encryption
software.'4
These provisions of the EAR define the concept of an "export" to include the electronic
transmission of software to locations outside of the United States and the making of
software (at least encryption software) available for download by persons located outside
of the United States. Using this definition, these provisions of the EAR imply that a
software supplier that proposes to fulfill orders for its products electronically or to make
software products available for download by its customers from the supplier's website or
online store, has the same export compliance responsibilities under the EAR as does any
entity that makes physical export shipments of tangible items (commodities, software, or
technology) to customers located outside of the United States.
III. Export Control Status of Application Software Products
As noted in Section I of this paper, supra, one of the fundamental elements in assuring
that software export transactions, including Internet transactions, are handled in compli-
ance with the export control requirements of the EAR is the determination of the correct
export classification (ECCN) and control status of the software product to be exported.
13. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b).
14. § 734.2(b)(9).
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There are essentially two rubrics under which a particular application software product
may be classified as a controlled item for export control purposes under the EAR:
a. A number of controlled ECCN categories on the Commerce Control List cover
software that is specially designed for the development, production, or use of con-
trolled commodities.' 5 Thus, for example, ECCN 3D003 imposes export controls on
certain CAD software for the design of semiconductor circuits.' 6 Correspondingly,
ECCN 5D001 imposes export controls on software that is required for the use of
controlled telecommunications equipment.' 7
b. Subject to certain limited exceptions, application software products are classified
under ECCN 5D002 and are subject to strict export controls if those products con-
tain or support data encryption functionality or features. Exceptions exist for software
products that: (i) use encryption technology solely for user authentication, password
protection, or other forms of access control; or (ii) utilize or support only very weak
encryption functionality (i.e., a symmetric encryption algorithm with a key length not
exceeding 56 bits or an asymmetric encryption algorithm with a key length not ex-
ceeding 512 bits). If a software application with encryption functionality does not,
however, fall within the scope of one of those exceptions, it will be subject to the
encryption (EI) export controls, and prior authorization from the Bureau of Industry
and Security will be required in order to export or reexport that software
application.18
The Cryptography Note to the Commerce Control List indicates that certain "mass
market" encryption software products are not subject to the strict encryption export con-
trol regime. Such "mass market" software products are those which: (i) are distributed
through retail distribution channels (including electronic transactions over the Internet);
(ii) include a cryptographic functionality that is not user-accessible and cannot be easily
changed by the user; and (iii) are designed for installation and use by the user without
substantial support from the supplier (i.e., "plug and play").19 An exporter may treat a
particular encryption software product as a "mass market" product only if that exporter has
obtained an export classification ruling from the Bureau of Industry and Security confirm-
ing that the product meets the "mass market" criteria, and is properly classified for export
control purposes under ECCN 5D992, in accordance with section 742.15(b)(1) of the
EAR.20
There is a great deal of software, including open source software, that is freely available
for download without restriction from the Internet. Such freely available software may be
excluded from the export controls described in this paper. Thus, "publicly available" tech-
nology and software are not subject to the EAR.21 Items and activities that are not subject
15. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 supp. 1 (2010).
16. Id. (Category 3).
17. Id. (Category 5, Part 1).
18. Section 740.17 of the EAR establishes license exception ENC, which authorizes the export and reex-
port, without export licenses, of software products with encryption functions or features classified under
ECCN 51002. In order to utilize that license exception ENC as authority for the export or reexport of a
particular encryption software product, however, the product must undergo "one time technical review" by
the Bureau of Industry and Security. 15 C.F.R. § 740.17(d); Part 774 supp. I (Category 5, Part 2).
19. 15 C.F.R. pt. 774 supp. I (Category 5, Part 2).
20. Id.
21. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3).
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to the EAR are outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the EAR and are not affected by
these regulations. 22
It should be emphasized, however, that the exclusion for "publicly available technology
and software" does not apply to (i) encryption software classified under ECCN 5D002 or
(ii) mass market encryption software classified under ECCN 5D992. 23 Accordingly, the
software supplier that proposes to make software products with encryption functions or
features available for download from an Internet site without restriction, even at no charge
to the end-user, will be required to satisfy the following export compliance steps with
respect to that encryption software:
a. Assuring that the software products are authorized for export. Generally, encryption
software that is available for download from an Internet site will meet the "mass mar-
ket" criteria of the Cryptography Note in the Commerce Control List, supra. As
explained above, however, under section 742.15(b)(1) of the EAR before that "mass
market" encryption software product may be made available for download by persons
located outside of the United States or Canada, a CCATS export classification ruling
for the software product must be obtained from the Bureau of Industry and Security,
confirming that the product does, in fact, meet the "mass market" criteria. 24
b. Unless the software products are made available for download on an anonymous ba-
sis, 25 taking steps to assure that the products will not be: (i) downloaded to a location
in an embargoed country; (ii) downloaded by, or made available to, a person or entity
listed on one of the U.S. government's lists of prohibited and restricted parties; or (iii)
used in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
IV. Specific Internet Software Export Transactions: Export Compliance
Obligations
Based on the provisions of the EAR outlined in the preceding Sections of this paper,
each of the following categories of Internet software export transactions carries with it
important export compliance responsibilities for the software supplier. Also, given the
nature of the Internet, these export transactions carry export compliance challenges for
the supplier that may not arise in transactions in which tangible items (i.e., carrier media)
embodying the software are physically shipped by the supplier to the foreign customer.
a. Electronic Fulfilment of Software Licensing Transaction: In this category of software




25. On September 11, 2009, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued an advisory opinion that provides
that a software supplier that makes mass market encryption software available for download from an internet
site on a free and anonymous basis would not be subject to these end-user and end-use compliance require-
ments. If, however, the software supplier collects information about the end-user, such as user name and e-
mail address, then the download transaction would not be considered anonymous, and the software supplier
would be deemed to be in violation of the EAR if the software was downloaded to an embargoed country or
by a prohibited or restricted person or entity. See Advisory Opinion, Bureau of Industry & Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Downloads of encrypted software reviewed and classified as 'mass marker'"
(Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/advisoryopinions/encryption-
intemet ao.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
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each of its customers. For the convenience of the parties and to minimize costs, (e.g.,
shipping costs, customs duties, if applicable, etc.) the software supplier transmits the
software over the Internet from the supplier's server to the customer's computer once the
software license agreement has been concluded. If the customer is located outside of the
United States, the transmission of that software from the supplier's server (located in the
United States) constitutes an export of that software under section 734.2(b)(1) of the EAR,
supra ("export" includes transmission of items subject to the EAR out of the United
States). Therefore, for such an electronic software transmission, the software supplier
must fulfill the following export compliance responsibilities:
* As the "exporter," the supplier must assure that the software is authorized for export
to the destination in question under authority of NLR, an export license exception,
or an export license issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security. As the software
in this type of commercial transaction is typically not publicly available without re-
striction and is not furnished on a no charge basis to the customer, the software will
not meet the requirements of section 734.3(b)(3) of the EAR.26 To the contrary, the
software product will be "subject to the EAR" within the meaning of section
734.3(a) of the EAR.27 Moreover, if the software product in question includes data
encryption functionality, and if the software is supplied to customers on the basis of
individual license agreements, the product will most likely not qualify as a "mass
market" encryption item. As such, it will be necessary to qualify that encryption
software product for eligibility for export under an authority of license exception
ENC through a "one time technical review" by the Bureau of Industry and Security
in accordance with section 740.17(d) of the EAR.28
* Section 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR identifies certain categories of encryption products
(e.g., network infrastructure commodities and software; encryption software in
source code form, other than open source; etc.) that are "restricted" for purposes of
license exception ENC. Even after such "restricted" encryption products have un-
dergone "one time technical review" by the Bureau of Industry and Security, in
order to be qualified for export under license exception ENC, these "restricted"
encryption products may not be exported, reexported, or transferred within a single
country to any "government end-user" unless it is located in one of the countries
listed in supplement no. 3 to part 740 of the EAR.29 An export license from the
Bureau of Industry and Security is required to provide any such "restricted" encryp-
tion product to any "government end-user" in any non-supplement no. 3 country.
Accordingly, if the software supplier's products have been classified by the Bureau of
26. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3).
27. Id.
28. Principal differences between the export compliance obligations applicable to mass market encryption
software products classified under ECCN 5D992 and other encryption software products classified under
ECCN 5D002 that have been qualified for export without export licenses under license exception ENC
include: (i) the requirement under section 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR to obtain export licenses in order to
supply "restricted" ECCN 5D002 software to "government end-users" in certain countries; and (ii) the re-
quirement of section 740.17(e) of the EAR that exports of ECCN 5D002 under license exception ENC must
be reported to the Bureau of Industry and Security on a semi-annual basis. § 740.17.
29. The Supplement No. 3 countries include: (i) Canada; (ii) all 27 member states of the European Union;
(iii) other European members of NATO (i.e., Norway, Iceland and Turkey); (iv) Switzerland; (v) Australia; (vi)
New Zealand; and (vii) Japan. Pt. 740 supp. 3.
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Industry and Security as "restricted" encryption products within the meaning of
section 740.17(b)(2) of the EAR, the supplier must determine if its customer (lo-
cated in a non-supplement no. 3 country) is a "government end-user" within the
meaning of the definition set forth in section 772.1 of the EAR before transmitting
or making those software products available to that customer.
As the software supplier knows the identity (and, presumably, the location) of each
individual customer, the supplier must take all appropriate steps to assure that the
software is not transmitted to or made available to a customer that: (i) is located in a
prohibited destination; (ii) is listed on one of the lists of prohibited and restricted
parties; or (iii) will use the software in connection with a WMD proliferation end-
use. To that end, the software supplier should take the following compliance steps
before concluding the software license agreement with and transmitting the
software to the prospective foreign customer:
(i) Confirm that the customer is not located in and will not transfer the software to
any person or entity located in an embargoed country.
(ii) Screen the customer (and any other party to the software licensing transaction)
against the various U.S. government lists of prohibited and restricted parties. If
there is a suspected "hit" in that screening process, then the software supplier
should not proceed with the transaction unless that "hit" is verified as a false
positive or unless an export license for the proposed transaction is obtained.30
(iii) Obtain an end-use statement from the customer. That end-use statement
should ideally include both: (a) an affirmative statement of the customer's in-
tended end-use of the software product; and (b) the customer's covenant and
undertaking that the software product will not be used, or made available to a
third party for use, in activities directly or indirectly related to WMD
proliferation.
b. Sale of Software Applications through Online Stores: In the past two years, led by Ap-
ple's enormously successful App Store, there has been tremendous growth and prolifera-
tion of online stores selling software applications for use on mobile telephones and other
handheld devices.31 Under the typical online store model, the entity operating the online
store authorizes third parties to develop software applications for distribution through the
online store, and the operator then makes those third-party software applications available
for purchase by customers through the online store. To that end, the customer registers
to use the online store, typically by providing the operator with his/her name, credit or
debit card number and e-mail address, and by accepting the operator's terms of use. The
customer is then granted access to a menu that identifies that software applications availa-
ble through the online store, and may select, purchase, and download the software appli-
cations that he/she wishes to acquire. In acquiring a particular software application, the
30. In most instances, if a person or entity appears on one of the lists of prohibited and restricted parties,
any application for an export license to supply items subject to the EAR to that person or entity will be
summarily rejected. Export licenses may, however, be granted on a case-by-case basis for the export or reex-
port of non-sensitive items subject to the EAR to certain entities listed on the Commerce Department's
Entity List, published as supplement no. 4 to part 744 of the EAR. pt. 744 supp. 3.
31. That online software application business already generates revenues for software application providers
in excess of $1 billion, and the business is expected to grow to at least $4 billion by 2012. See Douglas
MacMillan et al., Inside the App Economy, BusINEss WEEK, Nov. 2, 2009, available at http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/09_44/b4153044881892.htmchan=magazineChannel-top+stories.
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customer may be required to accept and agree to the terms and conditions of an end-user
license agreement (EULA) that states that the software application is licensed to the cus-
tomer directly by the sofhare developer.
Under the definition of an "export," if the online store operator's server is located in the
United States, an "export" of a software application occurs whenever that software appli-
cation is downloaded by a customer to a location outside of the United States. 32 Even if
the software application was originally developed abroad, once it is loaded onto the online
store operator's server in the United States, the software application becomes "subject to
the EAR" for U.S. export control purposes.33 Subsequent download of that software ap-
plication by a customer located outside of the United States is subject to the full range of
U.S. export compliance requirements and restrictions.
As noted above, the party to any export transaction with primary responsibility for as-
suring compliance with the requirements of the EAR applicable to that transaction is the
"exporter." In the online store model, there may be some uncertainty as to which of the
several parties to any software application download transaction is the "exporter" of that
software application, in the sense that: (i) the developer has developed the software, has
furnished the software application to the online store operator for international distribu-
tion, and is deemed, as least as a contractual matter, to be licensing the software directly to
the customer; (ii) the online store operator is the party that makes the software application
available for download, controls the software application acquisition and download trans-
action, and has visibility as to the identity of the customer, but may not have information
about the content or technical features of the software application; and (iii) the customer is
the party that actually initiates the download of the software from a server in the United
States to a foreign location. Nonetheless, in view of the definition of the term "exporter"
in section 772.1 of the EAR, the online store operator should be treated as the "exporter,"
the party in the United States with authority for controlling the transmission or download
of the software application to a location or person outside of the United States.34 As such,
the operator of an online software application store will have the following export compli-
ance responsibilities:
* Confirming that each software application is authorized for export in accordance
with the requirements of the EAR. To this end, the online store operator will have
to rely upon information provided by the various software application developers, as
those third party developers will be the only parties with detailed knowledge of the
content of their software applications. At a minimum, therefore, the online store
operator should require each developer to certify that his/her software applications
are duly authorized for export in accordance with the requirements of the EAR.
Moreover, as a matter of "best practice," the operator should also require each de-
veloper to certify that its software application does not contain or support any data
encryption functionality or features. If there is any such encryption function or
feature, the developer should be required to furnish to the operator a copy of the
CCATS export classification ruling from the Bureau of Industry and Security con-
firming that that software application meets the criteria for "mass market" encryp-
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tion items, and is properly classified for export control purposes under ECCN
5D992.35
* Taking steps to assure that no online store customer is located in an embargoed
country.36 To that end, the online store operator should, at a minimum take the
following three compliance steps. First, a customer must complete a registration
form in order to purchase software applications through the online store. The
menu for entering the customer's address should not have entries for, nor should the
registration form accept, any address located in an embargoed country (i.e., Cuba,
Iran, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria). Second, the online store operator should im-
plement an "IP blocker" so that a person with an Internet address in, or associated
with an embargoed country, (e.g., .cu; ir; .nk; .su; .sy) simply cannot access the on-
line store's website. Third, in agreeing to the online store terms of use, the cus-
tomer should acknowledge that the online store may not be accessed or used by any
person located in an embargoed country, and should certify that he/she is not lo-
cated in, or is a citizen or resident of any such embargoed country.
* Taking steps to prevent access to the online store by any person or entity included
on any of the U.S. government's lists of prohibited and restricted parties. Again,
there are at least three compliance steps that the online store operator should take to
minimize the risk that software applications will be downloaded by a prohibited or
restricted party, as follows. First, at the time that a prospective customer seeks to
register to use the online store, the operator should screen that prospective cus-
tomer against the various lists of prohibited and restricted parties. If there is, in fact,
a "hit" against one of those lists, the registration application should be rejected, and
the prospective customer should be denied access to the online store. Second, in
agreeing to the online store's terms of use, the customer should acknowledge that
the online store may not be accessed or used by any person or entity listed on any of
the U.S. lists of prohibited and restricted parties, and the customer should certify
that he/she is not included on any of those lists. Third, because the various lists of
prohibited and restricted parties change frequently, the online store operator should
periodically screen its entire customer database against the updated lists of prohib-
ited and restricted parties in order to confirm that no existing customer has been
added to one of those lists after he/she registered to use the online store.37
* Taking steps to prevent the use of software applications in WMD proliferation ac-
tivities. This may be the most difficult of the export compliance responsibilities to
fulfill in the online store context because the online store operator may have no way
in which to monitor or verify the end-users' actual use of the various software appli-
cations. At a minimum, however, the customer should be required to agree to the
35. See § 742.15(b)(l)-(2).
36. Because online store operators typically require customers to register to use the online store, and typi-
cally request that customers provide at least a name, e-mail address, and a valid credit or debit card number,
those online store operators would not be able to rely upon the provisions of the BIS advisory opinion with
respect to downloads by persons located in embargoed countries. See Bureau of Industry and Security, supra
note 6.
37. The foregoing steps are not, of course, "fool proof," but implementation of those steps should demon-
strate good faith on the part of the online store operator to assure compliance with end-user restrictions in
the EAR, and are consistent with the access control provisions of the EAR, See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii).
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online store's terms of use and to each EULA that any software application acquired
by the customer through the online store will not be used, or made available to a
third party for use, in any activities directly or indirectly related to WMD prolifera-
tion activities. The inclusion of such a provision in the terms of use and in each
EULA may negate "knowledge" on the part of the online store operator that the
software applications are intended for use by the customer in such prohibited end-
uses.38
c. Software as a Service or Cloud Computing: In recent years, various software developers
and suppliers have developed or adopted business models variously described as "software-
as-a-service" or "cloud computing." Under these business models, the customer sub-
scribes to a service, which allows the customer to access and use the computational capac-
ity of certain pre-determined software programs resident on the service provider's servers.
The customer may access these servers and software programs and manipulate the cus-
tomer's own data by means of the Internet. The attractiveness of the software as a service
or cloud computing business model is that it allows the customer to minimize its invest-
ment in information technology infrastructure (computers, software, etc.), as it is able to
use the service provider's infrastructure.
A key element of the software as a service business model is that the customer does not
purchase, and the service provider does not supply (either physically or electronically),
complex software products to run on the customer's computers. The export compliance
obligations applicable to this software as a service business model are frequently misun-
derstood. In a number of instances, U.S. based service providers have erroneously con-
cluded that they are not exporting any software, and therefore they have no compliance
responsibilities under the EAR or other U.S. export control laws and regulations (e.g., the
OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations, infra). In fact, however, each U.S. based
software-as-service provider must be aware of and analyze how its business is affected by
the following compliance responsibilities:
* In many instances, it will be necessary for the customer to download certain
software code in order to access and utilize the service provider's software. Typi-
cally, that software code is furnished to the customer only after the customer has
entered into a service agreement with the service provider. As such, the software
may not be treated as "publicly available" under section 734.3(b)(3) of the regula-
tions. 39 Accordingly, if the software code is to be furnished to a customer located
outside of the United States, even only on a transitory basis while the customer is
actually accessing and using the software, a software "export" transaction will occur.
The service provider must therefore comply with the full range of export compli-
ance responsibilities described in this paper (authorization for export, destination,
38. Under the non-proliferation provisions of sections 744.2, 744.3 and 744.4 of the EAR, an export license
is required for the export even of otherwise decontrolled items if, at the time of export, the exporter knows (or
has reason to know) that the items will be used directly or indirectly in the design, development, production,
stockpiling, testing or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missiles. §§ 744.2(a), 744.3(a),
744.4(a). Those non-proliferation restrictions apply to exports to almost all countries with respect to nuclear
weapons end-uses, to those countries listed in Country Group D:3 with respect to chemical and biological
weapons end-uses, and to those countries listed in Country Group D:4 with respect to missiles. See pt. 740
supp. I (listing the various "Country Groups" for export control purposes).
39. See § 734.3(b)(3).
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end-user, and end-use prohibitions and restrictions) in furnishing that software code
to the customer.40
* By contrast, there may be circumstances where the service provider does not provide
any software code or other proprietary technology to the customer, or where all
such software and technology is "publicly available" and is not therefore subject to
the EAR under section 734.3(b)(3) thereof.'" In such circumstances, the software as
a service transaction itself would not be subject to most of the provisions of the
EAR.42 That conclusion does not, however, imply that the service provider has no
compliance responsibilities in providing its software as a service to its customers
located outside of the United States. To the contrary, there are at least two sets of
compliance concerns that must be addressed by the service provider, as follows:
(i) A U.S. person must obtain an export license from the Bureau of Industry and
Security in order to perform "any contract, service, or employment" which will
directly assist in the proliferation of missiles in any Country Group D:4 country
or the proliferation of chemical or biological weapons in any country world-
wide.43 This applies to the furnishing of any service by a U.S. person to a
foreign customer, even when no commodities, software or technology subject
to the EAR are involved in the transaction. The service provider does, there-
fore, have an obligation, in any event, to assure that its customers will not use
the service in furtherance of any such WMD proliferation activity.
(ii) The OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations typically prohibit (a) the export or
reexport of any services from the United States to an embargoed country, or for
the benefit of the government of an embargoed country44; and (b) any transac-
tion whatsoever in which a person or entity on the OFAC list of specially desig-
nated nationals and blocked persons has an interest.45 In furtherance of its
obligations under those OFAC Economic Sanctions Regulations, the U.S.
based software-as-a-service provider must confirm that its customer is not lo-
cated in an embargoed country, will not utilize the service for the benefit of the
government of an embargoed country, and is not listed on the OFAC list of
specially designated nationals and blocked persons.46
* In the ordinary course of using the service provider's services, a foreign customer
may upload and download data to the service provider's servers in the United States.
40. Service providers should be aware of the provisions of the regulations governing the furnishing of code
required to activate any latent encryption functionality of any software product. See § 742.15(b)(4) (treating
software code and components that allow an end-user to activate or enable the cryptographic functionality of
other software products as controlled encryption items for export control purposes).
41. See § 734.3(b)(3).
42. See Advisory Opinion, Bureau of Industry & Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Application of
EAR to Grid and Cloud Computing Services" (Jan. 13, 2009) available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesand
regulations/advisoryopinions/janl3 2009_aoon.cloud.grid.computing.pdf (confirming that software "pub-
licly available under § 734.3(b)(3) . . . is not subject to the EAR").
43. § 744.6(a)(2).
44. See, e.g., Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204-05 (2010).
45. See, e.g., Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 595.201 (2010).
46. The OFAC Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List is available on the U.S. Dep't of
Treasury's website. OFFICE OF FOREIGN AssErs CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF TiHE TREASURY, SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED NArToNALs AND BLOCKED PERSONS (Apr. 28, 2010), availableat http-j/www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/sdn.
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To the extent that any such data constitute "technology" within the meaning of
section 772.1 of the EAR, the download of those data from the server in the United
States to the customer's computer abroad will constitute an "export" of technology
for U.S. export control purposes.47 Nonetheless, in its January 13, 2009, advisory
opinion, the Bureau of Industry and Security concluded that the U.S. based service
provider would not be the "exporter" of those data within the meaning of the defini-
tion of that term in section 772.1 of the EAR. 48 Accordingly, the U.S. based service
provider should not be liable for violating the EAR in the event that some of the
technology downloaded by the foreign customer is controlled under the EAR, and
would require an export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security for export
to the foreign customer's location.
High performance computers are controlled for export under ECCN 4A003, but
are eligible for export or reexport to most foreign destinations under authority of
license exception APP.49 Section 740.7(b)(2)(i) of the EAR, however, provides that
no Cuban, Iranian, North Korean, Sudanese, or Syrian national may have physical or
computational access to any computer that falls within the scope of license exception
ENC.s0 In accordance with section 740.7(b)(2)(i), as a matter of "best practice" and
out of an abundance of caution, the U.S. based service provider should include in its
service agreement-especially with foreign customers-a specific undertaking and
covenant on the part of the customer to the effect that no national of any such
embargoed country will utilize the service or will otherwise seek to obtain access to
the service provider's service. That provision should apply even if the servers that
will be accessed by any particular foreign customer are located outside of the United
States, if those servers were originally exported from the United States or are other-
wise subject to the EAR.
V. Conclusion
As explained in this paper, export compliance responsibilities do not disappear simply
because a software supplier uses electronic transmission over the Internet as the means of
delivering its products to its foreign customers or because the supplier adopts a software-
as-a-service business model. To the contrary, each time that a U.S. software supplier
transmits or permits the download of any product or software code to or by a foreign
customer, an export transaction occurs, to which the full range of export compliance re-
quirements and restrictions mandated by the EAR apply. The furnishing of a service to
foreign customers, under the software-as-a-service or cloud computing business model,
47. See 15 C.F.R. § 772.1; pt. 774 supp. 2.
48. See Advisory Opinion, supra note 25.
49. § 740.7(a)(1).
50. There is some ambiguity as to the scope of this prohibition on physical or computational access by
nationals of embargoed countries. The language of section 740.7(b)(2)(i) of the EAR prohibits access by
those embargoed country nationals to any computer that is "eligible for" license exception APP. That lan-
guage implies that the prohibition applies even if the servers in question are located in the United States. See
id. § 740.7(b)(2)(i). By contrast, the BIS's January 13, 2009 advisory opinion on software as a service and
cloud computing states that: "If a computer ... has been exported or reexported .. . under License Exception
APP[,] ... then the access restrictions would still apply, even if the computer ... will be used to provide a
service that is not subject to the EAR." Advisory Opinion, supra note 25.
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implies compliance responsibilities on the part of a U.S. service provider, even if no
software code or technology is provided to those foreign customers. The impersonal,
remote, and quasi-anonymous nature of many Internet transactions may make it unusually
difficult for a software supplier or service provider to fulfill these export compliance re-
sponsibilities. Nonetheless, any such software supplier or service provider will need to be
in a position to demonstrate its compliance efforts-along the lines recommended in this
paper-in order to avoid or mitigate severe export enforcement penalties, in the event that
its software products or services are diverted to an unauthorized destination, end-user, or
end-use.
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